




Make AGI preparedness a national priority

What Germany should do now in response to
rapid advances in AI

At a glance

Make AGI preparedness a national priority

Challenge

Both aggregated expert assessments and extrapolations from current trends in AI development suggest that the emergence of artificial general intelligence (»AGI«) between 2030 and 2040, or even earlier, is plausible, albeit not certain. AGI is defined as an AI system or model that equals or surpasses human performance on all or almost all cognitive tasks. The economic, societal and security implications of such a scenario would be immense – at least comparable to those of the Industrial Revolution, but unfolding over a much shorter period.

Conclusion

The German government must immediately make »AGI preparedness« a national priority. The possible courses of action to prepare for an AGI scenario must be analysed in depth. However, one thing is already clear: only by ensuring their competitiveness in AI can Germany and Europe avoid geopolitical marginalisation and a loss of sovereignty. Our key recommendations to the Federal Government for preparing for an AGI scenario are therefore:

1. **Massively simplify the regulatory framework for building AI data centres** – so that large-scale AI data centres can be built rapidly to enable the operation and development of AI in Germany and Europe.
2. **Comprehensively improve the framework conditions for venture capital investment in start-ups and scale-ups** – to mobilise substantial private investment in AI.
3. **Simplify the regulatory framework for data access in a targeted manner** – to enable the training of competitive AI models in Europe.
4. **Use the federal budget and public procurement to promote AI** – to leverage private investment and strengthen the state's capacity to act.
5. **Attract and develop AI talent** – to enable the development and deployment of AI.
6. **Strengthen the government's AI expertise** – to enable a swift and comprehensive response to the rapid development of AI

Every 3 months

Since 2024, the maximum length of software engineering tasks that AI can complete autonomously has doubled roughly every three months.

↗METR 2026

Content

1	AGI could emerge between 2030 and 2040, or even earlier	4
	AI researchers	4
	Leading individual voices	5
	Forecasting platforms	5
	Extrapolation of existing empirical trends	5
	Summary	7
2	An AGI scenario would have enormous economic, societal and security implications	8
3	Germany is inadequately prepared for an AGI scenario	9
4	Germany must make »AGI preparedness« a national priority	10
5	Germany must act now	14

1 AGI could emerge between 2030 and 2040, or even earlier

There is currently no consensus within the scientific community on the definition of »Artificial General Intelligence« (AGI). However, the most frequently cited definitions all describe very powerful and broad-ranging AI capabilities. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion below is based on the definition provided in the International AI Safety Report:

[A hypothetical AI model or system that equals or surpasses human performance on all or almost all cognitive tasks.¹](#)

Predictions about when AGI will emerge are, by their very nature, subject to considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, given the significance of this question in determining the urgency of political action, it is worthwhile examining the available evidence systematically. Four types of evidence are particularly instructive in this regard: firstly, the assessments of a broad range of respected AI researchers; secondly, the assessments of leading figures in AI companies and the AI research community; thirdly, established forecasting platforms with a strong predictive track record; and fourthly, the extrapolation of empirically observed trends in compute, data and algorithms, particularly in software development. Each of these four types of evidence comes with its own caveats; taken together, however, they paint a striking picture: the probability that AGI will emerge between 2030 and 2040, or even earlier, appears sufficiently high to justify serious preparations for this scenario.

For each of the four types of evidence, we provide a brief overview below of the most widely cited sources – without claiming to cover every source considered in the academic literature.

AI researchers

In the most comprehensive global survey to date of several thousand leading AI researchers, published in early 2024, the median estimated probability of **AGI emerging by the early 2030s was 25 per cent – while the probability of its emerging by the 2040s was 50 per cent.**² The definition of AGI used in the survey was: »Machines that, without human assistance, outperform humans at every conceivable task«. This definition also includes physical capabilities and is therefore more demanding than the reference definition used in the International AI Safety Report. It should be noted, however, that the group of respondents has repeatedly been surprised by the pace of short-term progress in the past and, taken as a whole, gave answers that were sometimes contradictory.³

¹International AI Safety Report, 2026.

² Grace et al., »Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI, 2024.

³ Grace et al., »Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI, 2024.

Leading individual voices

Some chief executives of major AI and technology companies, as well as leading AI researchers, now consider it highly plausible that AGI will be **achieved within the next two to ten years**.⁴ The individual statements on the timeframe for AGI's emergence are not based on a uniform definition of AGI. However, there is no reason to assume that, on average, the leading individual voices interpret the term in a significantly less ambitious way than the reference definition set out in the International AI Safety Report; if anything, the opposite is likely to be true. It should be noted, however, that self-selection effects and vested interests could distort the views expressed within this group. At the same time, it is precisely this group that has the greatest insight into the latest frontier developments.

Forecasting platforms

The best-known forecasting platform is probably »Metaculus«. The Metaculus community consists of thousands of active forecasters and has a particularly strong and well-calibrated track record in forecasting global events.⁵ **According to the platform, the median date by which the probability of AGI being developed reaches 50 per cent is early 2033** (as of early July 2026).⁶ It should be noted that the Metaculus community's definition of AGI is considered particularly ambitious and includes, among other capabilities, general robotics. One limitation of this forecast is that the community may be subject to self-selection effects and that its AI expertise has not been independently verified.

Extrapolation of existing empirical trends

Significant scope for further scaling of data and compute

Examining the scope for further development in two of the three components of the »AI triad« that has driven AI progress over the past ten years – compute and data – suggests that the global scaling of these factors is unlikely to encounter significant constraints in the years leading up to 2030. Calculations by the research organisation »Epoch AI« on data and compute show that the pace of scaling seen in recent years is likely to continue at least until 2030 without requiring any further fundamental scientific breakthroughs.⁷ In other words, unless the correlation observed over the past ten years between the scaling of these factors and the growth in AI capabilities unexpectedly breaks down, further significant advances in AI capabilities can be expected from these two factors alone.

⁴ Dilmevani et al., »AGI/Singularity: 9,800 Predictions Analysed, 2026.

⁵ Metaculus, »Exploring Metaculus's AI Track Record, 2023.

⁶ Metaculus, »Aggregation Explorer.

⁷ Epoch AI, »Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, 2024.

AI's ability to solve programming problems autonomously is growing exponentially

The greatest uncertainty in the forecasts concerns the third major driver of AI progress over the past ten years: algorithmic progress. However, it is precisely in this area that there is clear empirical evidence showing that the ability of AI models to autonomously complete software and AI development tasks has been growing exponentially for several years. A particularly important question in this context is when, and to what extent, AI can be used to automate AI research and development itself. Such effects could result in a self-reinforcing feedback loop that accelerates exponential progress in AI.⁸ Once almost all programming tasks have been fully automated, the complete automation of all cognitive abilities could also come within reach.⁹

The most frequently cited indicator of AI's progress in programming and AI development itself is the METR time-horizon study. It measures the difficulty of the software engineering tasks that the most powerful AI models can solve independently at a specified level of reliability, that is, at a specific success rate. The difficulty of a task is measured by how long a professional developer would take to complete it.¹⁰

Put simply: the longer a human takes to complete a task, the more complex it is. The study therefore measures the maximum level of task complexity that the most powerful AI models can still handle independently.

The result is remarkable: based on the historical trend between 2019 and the end of 2025, the maximum duration of tasks that leading AI models could handle roughly doubled every seven months on average – a clearly exponential rate of progress.¹¹ Since 2024, the doubling time has fallen to approximately three months, meaning that this exponential progress is accelerating further.¹²

If this rapid trend continues, AI models could, within the next year, handle 40-hour software engineering tasks with a 50 per cent success rate. According to METR, this threshold could be sufficient to increase the productivity of AI developers by a factor of ten.¹³

⁸ Davidson et al., ↗Three Types of Intelligence Explosion, 2025.

⁹ Davidson et al., ↗Three Types of Intelligence Explosion, 2025.

¹⁰ METR, ↗Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models, 2026.

¹¹ METR, ↗Time Horizon 1.1, 2026; METR, ↗Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models, 2026.

¹² METR, ↗Time Horizon 1.1; METR, ↗Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models, 2026.

¹³ METR, ↗Details about METR's evaluation of OpenAI GPT-5, 2025.

Furthermore, METR has recently shown that similar exponential increases in capability can also be observed in other areas – including mathematics, autonomous driving and the answering complex scientific questions – albeit at different absolute capability levels in each area.¹⁴




Figure 1 – Increase in the maximum duration of tasks that leading AI models can complete independently (METR time horizon).¹⁵

Summary

In summary, the German Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation (EFI) notes the following on the development of AGI in its annual report: »Some AI researchers predict that general AI will be achieved around 2040, while others expect it sooner«. ¹⁶ In their report »Europe and the geopolitics of AGI«, Negele et al. summarise the evidence, based on an economically oriented but no less ambitious definition of AGI, as follows: »On balance, we interpret this evidence to suggest that AI systems matching or exceeding humans at most economically valuable tasks could plausibly emerge between 2030 and 2040, and that there is a non-trivial chance of such systems arriving even sooner«. ¹⁷

At Bitkom, we come to a similar view of the evidence as a whole. The probability that AGI will emerge between 2030 and 2040, or even earlier, appears high enough to justify serious preparations for this scenario. In any case, excluding this scenario from policy planning would be incompatible with a prudent and epistemically sound approach.

¹⁴ METR, »How Does Time Horizon Vary Across Domains?, 2025.

¹⁵ METR, »Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models – METR, 2026.

¹⁶ Expert Commission on Research and Innovation, »Report on Research, Innovation and Technological Capability in Germany, p. 102, 2026.

¹⁷ Negele et al., »Europe and the geopolitics of AGI. The need for a preparedness plan, 2025.

2 An AGI scenario would have enormous economic, societal and security implications

If AGI were successfully developed, its implications would be enormous. Economically, AGI could trigger historically unprecedented growth – driven by the automation of human labour and a dramatic acceleration of science and research.¹⁸ Such a scenario could also entail significant political and societal challenges relating to education and employment. It is also worth noting that, although they did not explicitly refer to AGI, 200 leading figures from science, academia and the AI industry – including 16 Nobel laureates in economics – have warned that AI could transform the economy more profoundly over the next ten years than the Industrial Revolution did.¹⁹

From a security and defence perspective, AGI could mark an equally profound turning point: automated intelligence fusion, large fleets of autonomous systems, sophisticated cyber operations and entirely new classes of weapons could fundamentally shift the international balance of power.²⁰

Furthermore, AGI could give rise to new systemic AI risks or exacerbate existing ones – particularly those associated with offensive cyber capabilities, the misuse of AI to develop weapons of mass destruction, loss of control over misaligned AI systems, mass manipulation and the targeted manipulation of key decision-makers.²¹

It is already possible to form a relatively clear picture of what AGI might be capable of in the field of cybersecurity. In early April 2026, an AI model developed by Anthropic made headlines worldwide after demonstrating its ability to identify thousands of previously unknown vulnerabilities in widely used operating systems and browsers.²² Access to frontier AI capabilities – and, even more importantly, control over their deployment – is therefore already a significant factor in security and technology policy. The immediate impact of this was illustrated by the export control order issued by the US government in mid-June 2026 concerning Anthropic's frontier models, Mythos 5 and Fable 5.²³ It prohibited access by all foreign nationals and prompted Anthropic to shut down both models completely at short notice. As frontier AI capabilities continue to advance – and particularly under an AGI scenario – this source of power will grow exponentially.

¹⁸ Negele et al., 'Europe and the geopolitics of AGI. The need for a preparedness plan, 2025.

¹⁹ Stanford Digital Economy Lab, 'We Must Act Now. A Statement on AI's Transformation of the Economy.

²⁰ Negele et al., 'Europe and the geopolitics of AGI. The need for a preparedness plan, 2025.

²¹ 'International AI Safety Report, 2026; Hendrycks et al., 'An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks, 2023.

²² Anthropic, 'Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era, 2026.

²³ Sircar, A., 'Anthropic Disabled Fable 5 and Mythos 5 Following a US Export Control Order. Here's What Happened, 2026.

Countries with access to and control over this technology could thus secure decisive and enduring superiority over other states, both economically and in terms of security capabilities.²⁴

3 Germany is inadequately prepared for an AGI scenario

Predictions about such transformative developments are subject to considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is concerning that the possibility of AGI emerging between 2030 and 2040, or even earlier – a scenario that a significant proportion of the world’s leading AI experts consider plausible – has so far barely featured in Germany’s political debate or prompted any discernible policy action.

The former White House AI adviser spoke publicly about how the Biden administration was already seriously preparing for an AGI scenario in the near future.²⁵ By contrast, there is still no sign that the German government has developed either a comprehensive preparedness plan or a strategy for highly transformative AI development scenarios.

²⁴Negele et al., ‘Europe and the Geopolitics of AGI: The Need for a Preparedness Plan’, 2025.

²⁵ Buchanan, B., ‘The Government Knows AGI Is Coming’, The New York Times, 2025.

4 Germany must make »AGI preparedness« a national priority

Germany needs a clear political commitment at the highest level to treat »AGI preparedness« – and AI policy more broadly – as a national priority. The possible development scenarios for advanced AI, including AGI and beyond, their far-reaching consequences, and the options for action available to Germany and Europe must be analysed with sufficient resources and at the appropriate level of government. The resulting insights must then be acted upon consistently, swiftly and across departments. The Federal Government's decision to set up an »AI Task Force« for cross-departmental coordination is a first step in the right direction.²⁶ This must now be followed by the Task Force – or a similar body – taking responsibility for the major strategic questions surrounding AGI.

Building Germany's competitiveness in AI must clearly play a central role in this effort – regardless of the exact pace of further technological progress. Only by developing its own capabilities in AI infrastructure, AI development and AI deployment will Germany be able to use the technology in accordance with its own values and address the associated societal issues on its own terms. Otherwise, there is a risk that these questions will largely be decided on Germany's behalf by the United States or China.

From Bitkom's perspective, the Federal Government must act on two levels simultaneously to strengthen Germany's AI competitiveness.

Firstly, the framework conditions for building AI data centres, accessing data and raising venture capital must be designed so that private capital flows on a very large scale into AI development, AI deployment and AI infrastructure. Secondly, the state itself must launch a targeted investment drive to leverage private investment and strengthen its own AI capacity and expertise. The guiding principle should be to seek coordination with EU partners, while ensuring that ambitious national action is not delayed where there is no direct dependence on other Member States.

In concrete terms, this means, at the very least:

²⁶ Brüning, A.; Schulz, L., »Artificial Intelligence: German Government Establishes Task Force, 2026.

1. Massively simplify the regulatory framework for building AI data centres

Germany is currently at risk **of falling behind internationally on the availability of domestic AI computing capacity**. Studies by Deloitte²⁷ and KIRA²⁸ forecast an investment shortfall in the tens of billions of euros to meet Germany's AI computing capacity requirements by 2028 and 2030 respectively – even without accounting for domestic frontier AI model training. As AI capabilities increase, the demand for AI computing capacity is also rising rapidly. AI computing capacity is thus becoming an increasingly scarce strategic resource globally. Inadequate computing infrastructure in Germany and a lack of diversification are creating a growing economic and security vulnerability for Germany and Europe.

The expansion of AI computing capacity in Germany and across Europe must therefore become a key political priority. Closing the gap described above will require, at the very least, highly ambitious implementation of Germany's data centre strategy. At European level, the Federal Government must also advocate for an ambitious regulatory framework and the rapid expansion of capacity under the Cloud & AI Development Act (CADA). The aim must be to substantially improve the framework conditions for the planning, construction and operation of data centres.²⁹ In practical terms, this means accelerating planning and permitting procedures, making suitable sites and network connections available, expanding energy infrastructure and introducing pragmatic regulation, including through the revision of the Energy Efficiency Act. To create the best possible conditions for rapid expansion, priority should also be given to establishing specially designated data centre development zones.

2. Comprehensively improve the framework conditions for venture capital investment in start-ups and scale-ups

Between 2013 and 2024, German AI start-ups received 13.2 billion euros – equivalent to just 2.8 per cent of the amount invested in the sector in the United States (470 billion euros).³⁰ This enormous gap must be narrowed if Germany and Europe are to become genuinely competitive in AI. At the same time, it is clear that no single European country will be able to close the gap with the United States on its own. EU Member States should therefore adopt a more strongly European approach and support the swift and ambitious implementation of initiatives such as the Capital Markets Union, EU Inc. and the Scaleup Europe Fund. In addition, institutional investors must be mobilised and attractive European exit opportunities created.³¹

²⁷ Lorentz et al., *AI Infrastructure Study*, Deloitte, 2025.

²⁸ Fox et al., *Compute Report 2025*, KIRA, 2025.

²⁹ We have set out detailed recommendations for action here: Bitkom e.V. *Data Centre Action Plan*, 2025.

³⁰ Nestor Maslej et al., *Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025* (p. 254, Stanford Human-Centred AI Institute).

³¹ Bitkom has set out comprehensive recommendations here for improving the framework conditions for AI venture capital funding: *German Start-ups (2025)* and *the AI Paradox* and *Just Europe*, 2026.

3. Simplify the regulatory framework for data access in a targeted manner

Restricted access to data is significantly hampering the development of AI in Germany. The causes include strict regulatory requirements and inconsistent interpretation of the GDPR, as well as the insufficient availability of data from public administration and industry. For instance, 69 percent of German companies state that data protection regulations make it difficult to train AI models using sufficiently large and high-quality datasets.³² Furthermore, 63 percent fear that strict data protection requirements will lead AI companies to relocate their activities outside the EU.³³

Germany should therefore actively advocate for a targeted, innovation-friendly reform of the GDPR within the framework of the EU Data Omnibus Package. The aim must be a more risk-based approach that creates legal certainty and enables data-driven innovation. At the same time, data stewardship models should be strengthened and the legally compliant use of privacy-enhancing technologies – such as federated learning and synthetic data – should be specifically promoted. Furthermore, the release and use of public administration data at all levels of government should be significantly accelerated.

4. Use the federal budget and public procurement to promote AI

According to our calculations, and excluding military expenditure on AI, the Federal Government plans to invest just over 1 billion euros from its total budget of 555 billion euros. Yet 300 billion euros would be available from the special fund for infrastructure and digitalisation alone, which was approved last year.³⁴ This level of investment is far too low given the enormous challenges posed by an AGI scenario.

Firstly, the state must play a much stronger role as a key customer for AI solutions and infrastructure and aggregate demand across the Federal Government, the federal states, local authorities and state-owned enterprises.³⁵

Furthermore, significantly higher expenditure is needed to implement the Hightech AI Agenda for Germany. Many of the announced measures³⁶ are, in principle, to be welcomed, although many questions regarding their implementation remain unanswered. However, with a planned total annual funding volume of just a few hundred million euros (excluding the AI Gigafactory Initiative), there is a risk that these measures will amount to little more than a drop in the ocean and fail to leverage substantial private investment.

Industrial and physical AI, as well as AI in healthcare, could become particularly important sources of strength, strategic autonomy and future value creation for

³² Bitkom e.V., *„Data Protection in the German Economy*, 2025.

³³ Bitkom e.V., *„Data Protection in the German Economy*, 2025.

³⁴ Federal Ministry of Finance, *„The Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality*, 2026.

³⁵ See also the *„Recommendations of the Competition & Artificial Intelligence Commission*.

³⁶ Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR), *„Germany's High-Tech Agenda*, 2025.

Germany and Europe. To achieve this, the High-Tech Agenda must cover the entire development chain, from basic research to market entry.

Furthermore, the Federal Government must invest heavily in AI education and training across all skill levels and throughout the education system (see the next section).

5. Attract and develop AI talent

The shortage of skilled workers needed to develop and deploy AI systems and models is already one of the most frequently cited barriers to business adoption of AI.³⁷ In view of the AI developments expected in the coming years, AI skills will become a key prerequisite for social and economic participation. The Federal Government must therefore urgently invest in AI education: from specialised degree programmes and PhD positions, through foundational university modules, to state-funded continuing professional development programmes for skilled workers and the workforce as a whole.

Developing, retaining and attracting leading AI talent deserves particular attention. In an AGI scenario, a country's innovative strength and competitiveness will depend even more heavily on such talent than they do today. Germany must therefore make a far greater effort to attract leading AI experts, including through fast-track immigration procedures and attractive working and research conditions.

6. Strengthen the government's AI expertise

To make well-informed decisions and respond at the necessary pace to rapid developments in artificial intelligence, the state requires substantial in-house technical expertise and sufficient staffing capacity. To date, Germany has lacked the institutional structures needed to independently evaluate frontier AI models and to build the strategic awareness required to identify the associated risks and impacts at an early stage. There is a growing danger that government action will systematically fall behind technological progress.

Building the government's AI expertise must therefore become a political priority. In this context, we welcome the National Security Council's decision to establish a German AI Security Institute. The institute's design and governance will be critical to its success. We advocate establishing a world-class German AI Security Institute modelled on the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI). This will require top talent, agile structures and at least 100 million euros in start-up funding, as well as 75 million euros in annual follow-up funding. Close coordination with the UK AISI, the European AI Office and other AI security institutes will also be essential.³⁸

Furthermore, staffing capacity for AI policy in the relevant ministries must be expanded to reflect the scale of the challenge and positions must be filled with suitably qualified personnel. By way of comparison, according to statements by British government officials, in addition to the more than 100 technical staff at the UK AI Security Institute, an estimated 150 or more people work solely on AI policy across the UK government.

³⁷ Scheufen et al. (IW Cologne), *Objectives, Cost-Benefit Ratio and Barriers to Artificial Intelligence in the German Economy*, 2025.

³⁸ See detailed implementation recommendations here: Bitkom e.V., *German AI Security Institute*, 2026.

Measured in full-time equivalents, this is likely to be several times greater than the corresponding staffing capacity within the German Federal Government. It is therefore essential to increase staffing levels and reprioritise resources where necessary so that the German Federal Government can address the greatest transformational challenge of the post-war era at least as effectively as the UK government.

5 Germany must act now

In light of credible expert forecasts suggesting that AGI could plausibly be developed between 2030 and 2040 – or even earlier – **the German government should take steps before the end of this year to prepare Germany and Europe for the greatest disruption in post-war history.** It is important to note that even if the pace of development seen in recent years were to slow abruptly, contrary to current trends, and AGI were to take longer to materialise, the proposed measures would remain valuable. Even with today's AI capabilities, they would help address Germany's existing weaknesses in economic growth, innovation and technological sovereignty.

This path may well require the most courageous political agenda in Germany's post-war history – at a time when many outside specialist circles have yet to fully recognise the urgency and significance of the issue. This is likely to be in part because people have been shown to systematically underestimate, by a considerable margin, the effects of exponential growth³⁹, as demonstrated by the widespread misjudgements at the beginning of the Covid pandemic⁴⁰. However, any politician who adopts a wait-and-see approach until the disruption becomes impossible to ignore will have already lost most of their ability to shape events. The much-discussed »Europe 2031« scenario, developed by a group of European AI experts, vividly illustrates how quickly Europe could permanently lose much of its agency if it continues to underestimate the speed of AI progress and the scale of its impact.⁴¹ There is therefore also broad agreement within the European Commission's »European Expert Forum on Frontier AI« that Europe's political leadership must immediately make comprehensive action on AI policy a priority.⁴² We at Bitkom share this view.

The question is no longer whether artificial intelligence will transform the foundations of the economy, the state and society, but whether Germany and Europe **will shape** this transformation from a **position of strength and autonomy or simply endure it.** The window of opportunity to choose the former course remains open, but it appears to be closing rapidly.

³⁹ Springer Nature, »Misperception of exponential growth | Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics | Springer Nature Link, 1975.

⁴⁰ PNAS, »Correcting misperceptions of exponential coronavirus growth increases support for social distancing | PNAS, 2020.

⁴¹ Europe2032, »Europe 2031. What getting AI wrong means for us, 2026.

⁴² European Commission, »AI Office publishes frontier AI expert findings on EU competitiveness, sovereignty and security, 2026; Negele, M; Touzet, C., »The First European Expert Forum on Frontier AI: A summary of the first meeting on 23 April 2026, endorsed by 53 participants | Zenodo, 2026.

Bitkom represents more than 2,000 member companies across the digital economy. In Germany, these companies generate revenues of just over 200 billion euros from digital technologies and solutions and employ more than two million people. Bitkom's members include more than 1,000 small and medium-sized enterprises, over 700 start-ups and almost all major global companies in the sector. They provide software, IT services, telecommunications and internet services; manufacture devices and components; operate in the digital media sector; create content; provide platforms; or are otherwise part of the digital economy. Of the companies represented by Bitkom, 82 percent have their headquarters in Germany, a further 8 percent are based elsewhere in Europe and 7 percent in the United States. The remaining 3 percent are based in other regions of the world. Bitkom promotes and drives the digital transformation of the German economy and advocates broad participation across society in digital developments. Its aim is to make Germany a high-performing and digitally sovereign hub.

Publisher

Bitkom e.V.

Albrechtstr. 10 | 10117 Berlin

Contact

Janis Hecker | Head of AI – Regulation & Strategy

T +49 30 27576-239 | j.hecker@bitkom.org

Responsible Bitkom committee

AK AI 2026

Copyright

Bitkom 2026

This publication provides general, non-binding information. **Its contents reflect** Bitkom's views at the time of publication. Although the information has been compiled with the utmost care, no warranty is given as to its **accuracy, completeness or timeliness**; in particular, this publication cannot take into account the specific circumstances of individual cases. **Any use of this publication is therefore at the reader's own risk. Bitkom accepts no liability.** All rights, including the right to reproduce extracts, are reserved by Bitkom or the respective rights holders.